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Abstract
This paper applies the model presented by J. Merrick Jr.
(2001) to estimate both the default recovery rates and the im-
plied default probabilities of the Argentinean Sovereign Bonds
during the crisis which took place in December 2001. Between
October 19th and December 24th 2001, the average bond price
level reected a downward trend, falling from USD 56.8 to USD
26.5 for each USD 100 face value. Similarly, default recovery rates
descended from USD 38.7 to USD 20.8 whereas the base default
probability registered an increase from 19.4% to 45.5%. Thus,
bond price volatility could be explained in terms of these two em-
bedded determinants. According to the model, bond prices were
overvalued by USD 3.92 on average, which amounts to 12.9%;
even when it is generally assumed that the default was foreseen
by the market in December 2001. In accordance with private
estimations of the Argentinean debt haircut which set it at 70%
and the recovery rate estimated by the model which amounts
to USD 21.7, Argentina would have overcome its default with a
country risk premium of around 1960 basic points. Such a high
country risk spread after debt restructuring would fully justify a
deep haircut over the face value, the temporal term structure and
interest rate coupons.
I am particularly grateful to Adrian Alfonso for his very useful comments and
kind guidance. Thanks also to Federico Sturzenegger for his helpful comments and
suggestions and to Adrian Furman for his technical support. All errors are entirely
my own.
yE-mail: ramiro.sosanavarro@univ-evry.fr
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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, the theory of pricing credit risk has been put
forward in order to measure corporate debt. Even if similar approaches
should be applied for the calculation of sovereign risk, it becomes essen-
tial to point out the di¤erences between risky corporate debt and risky
sovereign debt as well as their consequences in valuing assets. For in-
stance, emerging country sovereign bonds are issued in countries such as
the United States of America and the United Kingdom, under completely
di¤erent legal jurisdiction and capacity of enforcement if compared with
corporate bonds. Emerging countries are more stable than corporations,
they are fewer in number, they have longer-term economic planning,
they do not default as frequently as corporations do and they do not
typically disappear. Consequently, there is considerably less empirical
evidence of default on sovereign debt than on corporate debt.1
Thus, the approaches applied by portfolio managers in Argentina
in 2001 were grounded on the analysis of domestic and foreign data
generated by earlier international crises, such as those of Mexico (1995),
Russia (1998) and Brazil (1999). One of the approaches consisted in the
analysis of the time series in relation to indicators such as peaks, trends
and the volatility of domestic and foreign sovereign bond price levels.
An alternative approach based on a sensitivity analysis considers the
bond market price in order to calculate the implied default probability
for di¤erent possible recovery rates and spreads. This method entails
forming conjectures about the value of recovery and size of spread by
resorting to evidence provided by earlier crises.2
The disadvantage of this approach is that its outcomes result from
di¤erent bond temporal term structures; and hence from di¤erent bond
durations when compared to those of the analysed bonds. Consequently,
the information provided is misleading. Moreover, the approach does not
include information concerning recently issued bonds nor the particular
macroeconomic conditions of the country subject to analysis. There-
fore, these methods neglect highly relevant information which is later
incorporated into the analysis ad-hoc.
1For a survey of the literature concerning this topic, see Altman Edward, Andrea
Resti and Andrea Sironi (2004), Default Recovery Rate in Credit Risk Modeling: A
Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence. Economic Notes by Banca dei
Monte dei Paschi di Siena. Volume 33.
2For an example of this approach, see Federico Sturzenegger (2000), Defaults
Episodes in 90s: Factbook, Tool-kit and Preliminary Lessons, prepared for the
World Bank, which presents an example of this exercise (page 14).
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As regards the theoretical background, most of the models focus on
default risk adopting static assumptions, treating default recovery rates
either as a constant parameter or as a stochastic variable independent of
the probability of default. The connection between default recovery rates
and implied default rates has traditionally been disregarded by credit
risk models. Accordingly, the problem faced by analysts in 2001 was
how to settle default recovery rates and the implied default probability
of their portfolios, only on the grounds of their bond prices. Now, if
the bond price is a function of two unknown determinants, how could
analysts calculate both of them simultaneously and consistently?
Knowledge of both bond price determinants the default recovery
rate and the implied default probability enables the analyst to antici-
pate the value of their position in case of default and assume a long or
short position according to the benchmark, among other strategic deci-
sions. As a result, the motivation of this research was based on the lack
of methodology applied by Argentinean portfolio managers in valuing
their stressed portfolios of Sovereign Bonds in the period previous to the
economic collapse.
In order to avoid these disadvantages, we have applied a model, origi-
nally presented by Merrick (2001), to estimate the default recovery rates
and the implied default probabilities in Argentinean Sovereign Bond
prices.
1.1 Brief Summary of Events Preceding the Crisis
Before presenting the model, it is worth looking at the most important
events which caused the Argentinean crisis in December 2001. In August
1998, Russia defaulted on their public debt depriving Argentina of access
to the international capital market. Five months later, Brazil devalued
their currency causing Argentinas competitiveness in foreign markets
to deteriorate. The economy sank into recession with twin decits
a trade balance gap and a scal budget gap which foreigners were
less and less willing to nance. Argentinean economy needed to regain
competitiveness and since the exchange rate could not be permitted to
fall, prices and wages had to drop. In December 1999, after the general
election, Mr. De la Rúa was elected to o¢ ce but the new political
structure was too weak to face the strong political change necessary to
overcome the crisis.
As a consequence, peso quotation edged downwards, tax revenues
faltered and Argentinas debts in US dollars became harder to repay. In
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spite of this, Argentina refused to fold and kept raising the stakes. At the
beginning of 2001, Argentina requested a USD 15 billion loan from the
IMF, which was known as blindajeor armour. In order to buy some
time, in June 2001, the country completed the notorious megaswapin
which near-dated securities were exchanged for longer-dated securities,
higher-yielding bonds. In August 2001, Argentina received a second $8
billion bail-out. Finally, political turmoil and lack of further assistance
from multilateral institutions drove Argentina into default in December
2001 (see Graph1).
This paper is divided in three sections. Section II describes the Model
and the Data, Section III analyses the estimations and results and Sec-
tion IV presents the conclusions. Finally, the Appendix produces a de-
tailed presentation of the estimated results and other complementary
data.
Graph 1: Argentinean Sovereign-Debt Spread.
Relevant Pre-Default Events.
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2 The Model
This section presents the pricing framework forN -period sovereign bonds,
which is made up of four elements.
The rst element is the Bond Structure, which is made up of the
coupons and the principal, showing the amount of the coupon paid in
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the period t as Ct and the amount of the principal paid on due date in
the period N as FN .
The second component is the default recovery rate which is repre-
sented with letter R. In this analysis, R is the amount paid to the
bondholder immediately after default has been announced.3
The third element is the adjusted risk-neutral payment probability
distribution. Denote the adjusted probability of default during the spe-
cic date (t  1) to date t period as pt.Moreover, we will dene Pt as the
joint probability of no default between the moment when the bond is is-
sued and the moment t , when the payment of the coupon is made. Thus,
the Risk-Free Adjusted Payment Probability is indicated by means of pt
and dened as: 4
pt = Pt + Pt 1
The fourth and last element is the risk-free present value discounted
factor for a time t cash ow, denoted ft. The discount rate used is the
risk-free rate, since the risk is captured by the third term, as it is shown
in equation (1) below.
Having described the four elements, we are in a better position to
state equation (1) which enables us to value a bond through the ex-
pected present value of cash ows. As it has already been suggested by
Jonkhart (1979), Fons (1987) and Hurley and Jonson (1996), we state
that the present value of a bond is the sum of its expected cash ows
(coupons, principal and the recovery rate), multiplied or adjusted by
their probability. As in Leland and Toft (1996) and Merrick (2001),
the probability distribution used here is interpreted as the implied risk-
neutral distribution. Henceforward, we are implicitly referring to risk-
neutral probabilities.
V0 =
NX
t=1
fPt:ft:Ctg+ fPN :fN :FNg+
NX
t=1
fpt:ft:Rg (1)
It should be noted that expressing the pricing equation in these terms
implies that the asset risk becomes captured by the implied default prob-
ability and its complement the probability of receiving the promised
3The recovery rate can also be dened as the expected present value of cash
ows, which have been or are to be reprogrammed. For a detailed presentation, see:
Recovery Rates: The Search of Meaning. High Yield. Merrill Lynch. March 2000.
4Alternatively, the probability of receiving a promised date t coupon payment,Pt
, can be expressed as: Pt = 1 
Pt
s=1 ps.
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payment, and by the default recovery rates whereas cash ows coupons
and principalremain discounted at the risk-free rate. Otherwise, the
asset risk is generally enclosed in the discount rate.
Let us now outline the model a little further. Before stating the
joint probability of no default, Pt, we dene the risk-neutral default
probability rate, noted as t. Previous researches, such as Fons (1987)
and Bhanot (1998), consider a constant t. Our proposal, as much as
Merrick (2001), understands t as an increasing linear function with
respect to time, t, as it is shown in equation (2):
t = + : [t] (2)
The purpose of this function is to capture the default probability
temporal term structure throughout time in a parsimonious way. This
formalisation registers the fact that in a critical period, the probability
of default is greater as the deadline of the coupons and the amortisation
become closer in time.5
Thus, the joint probability of no default, Pt, can be dened as:
Pt=(1  t) (3)
Pt=(1  (+ : [t]))
In which parameters  and  are restricted so that Pt is always
less than or equal to one or greater or equal to zero. Consequently,
equation (4) explicitly states the three unknown elements, R,  and 
incorporated in the model:
V0 =
NX
t=1

(1  (+ : [t]))t :ft:Ct
	
+ (4)n
1  (+ : [N ])N

:fN :FN
o
+
NX
t=1

(1  (+ : [t  1]))t 1   (1  (+ : [t]))t :ft:R	
Having established the equations, it is possible to present the model
that allows for a consistent estimation of the three unknown variables,
5Otherwise, during crisis long-term default probabilities might be lower than the
short-term conditional on the sovereigns ability to avoid the case to fall into default.
This e¤ect is not captured by this assumption. See Andrezky, J. R. (2004) which
assumes a Gumbel distribution to capture the shape the temporal term structure.
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which will, in turn, enable us to know the default recovery rate and
the default probability temporal term structure. In order to do this, we
dene equation (5) as the sum square of residuals (SSR) and equation
(6) as the sum of residuals equalised to zero.
SSR0 =
lX
i=1

Vi;0  
^
Vi;0
2
(5)
where Vi;0 denote the bond price (market price) and
^
Vi;0 denote the
estimated bond price
lX
i=1

Vi;0  
^
Vi;0

= 0 (6)
The model has three unknown variables and is formalised through
the statement of ve equations; i.e., i = 1; ::::5.
For the model to be consistent, it is assumed that the bonds have
a cross-default clause which is a realistic assumption in the case of
Argentina. This assumption implies that there is a representative default
recovery rate for the economy as a whole.
We employ a Solver that minimises square residuals equation (5)
 on condition that the sum of errors is equalised to zero equation
(6). The Solver applies the Generalised Gradients Method to estimate
the unknown elements. 6
We have selected the ve most representative bonds of the econ-
omy i.e., the bonds which have been most actively traded in the short,
medium, and long term. From these ve bonds we obtain the default
recovery rate and the default probability temporal term structure, which
are the most representative determinants of the economy for a given mar-
ket price structure at each moment in time. Subsequently, this exercise
is repeated for each day of the analysed period.
The Appendix includes an example that shows the estimated results
based on the market price structure of October 1st 2001. The data and
results concerning the fourth quarter 2001 are shown in a Table.
6In this paper, we have used the Solver included in Microsoft O¢ ce Package.
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2.1 Description of the Data
For the period subject to analysis October 2001- December 2001
we have considered 5 Global Bonds, denominated Eurobonds, at a xed
rate, with semestrial coupons and amortisation at nish. These charac-
teristics are specied below:
Table 1: Sample of US-Dollar denominated Eurobonds
Name Issue Date Maturity Date Coupons
Arg. 03 20-Dec-1993 20-Dec-2003 8.375
Arg. 06 09-Oct-1996 09-Oct-2006 11.000
Arg. 10 15-Mar-2000 15-Mar-2010 11.375
Arg. 17 30-Jan-1997 30-Oct-2017 11.375
Arg. 27 19-Sep-1997 19-Sep-2027 9.758
These bonds are not guaranteed. They have a cross-default clause
and they were issued under the jurisdiction of English Courts in London.
This analysis was carried out considering the daily prices supplied by
the Secretary of Finances of the National Ministry of Economy from the
Argentine Republic.
Figure 1 shows the average daily prices for the bonds which have
been described as representative of the economy for the period we are
analysing. Figure 2, in turn, species the same series considering each
of the bonds individually.
Figure 1 : Average Bond Prices
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Figure 2 : Individual Bond Prices
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3 Description of Estimations
This section deals with the model estimations concerning the aforemen-
tioned Eurobonds for the case of the Argentinean domestic crisis. We
will focus on the fourth quarter in 2001.
Figure 2 presents default recovery rates and base default probabilities
both implied in market prices. It is worth noticing that the Base Default
Probability is dened in the model by means of parameter Alfa (). The
estimations regarding parameter Beta (), which we employ to calculate
the default probability temporal term structure, shows an increasing
linear trend with respect to time. However, we will not analyse the
estimations of the Betas.7
Figure 2: Estimated Default Recovery Rates and Base Default
Probabilities.
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7For a detailed presentation, see Andritzky, J. R. (2004).
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This Figure (see also Figure 3) shows that in the period extending
from October 1st to October 11th, both curves are stable, whereas from
October 12th to November 6th, the curves are unstable, and produce
a saw-like shape. The same sequence is repeated in the sub-periods
extending from November 7th to December 5th, and from December
5th to December 28th. As regards the stability of the last sub-period, it
should be pointed out that the exception is the estimation correspondent
with December 20th.
Figure 3: Default Recovery Rates and Base Default Probabilities
classied by the stability of results.
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The changes evidenced in the behaviour of curves are primarily due to
the fact that in stable portions, the square residuals of these estimations
are low (one digit) whereas in unstable portions, square residuals range
from 15 to 30 (see the table of results in the Appendix). The estimations
show that in the cases in which residuals are close to zero, the Solver has
found a combination of prices which exactly reproduces the market curve
(see the example for October 1st in the Appendix). As it has already
been said, moderate changes in the estimated parameters reproduce the
behaviour of market prices.
In the second place, the portions in which the Solver makes estima-
tions with bigger square residuals coincide with the portions in which
bond prices experience a change in the trendline (or are more volatile).
For the cases in which square residuals are bigger, the Solver returns
as a result the value of the parameters subject to signicant errors, so
10
that we obtain a result that belongs to an interval of broader values,
which explains why the series registers more unstable behaviour. This
might be solved by using a Solver of a higher resolution which could
always nd an alternative combination of prices reproducing with greater
precision the market curve and parameters. This is an attempt to obtain
more accurate results for all possible market price structures.
The information provided by the model enables the individualisation
of the parameters ruling over market prices. But in order to improve
the quality of the information supplied and as a result of the preceding
analysis, we have plotted the series considering the moving average in
the last two periods (days) to obtain a more stable series which can
average out the statistic errors produced by the Solver used (See Figure
4a). Alternatively, the same series is presented with a moving average
of 4 periods, getting closer to the last moving week (See Figure 4b).
Figure 4: Default Recovery Rate and Base Default Probability with
Trendline
Figure 4a: Two moving average
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Figure 4b: Four moving average
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As it has already been mentioned and in keeping with the preceding
gures, it has been shown that the period October 1st - October 11th
registers that both curves are stable and that the default recovery rate
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registers a downward trend whereas the Default Probability reveals an
upward trend, both being coherent with a drop in bond prices. It must
be observed that both determinants show a moderate gradient which
corresponds to the trend intensity registered by market prices. Subse-
quently, the opposite phenomenon is registered in the rst half of the
second sub-period. Thus, we can conclude that the Model presented is
capable of assessing slight oscillations in market prices. In such cases,
the Solver can nd a structure of prices which minimises square residuals
to zero (or a number very close to zero).
However, when market prices experience a change in the trendline the
estimated parameters are less precise and the square residuals become
bigger. In this manner, short periods (less than a week), register a
positive correlation between default recovery rates and implied default
probabilities.
To sum up, it should be expected that:
 The increase in prices was accompanied by an increase in default
recovery rates and a fall of implied default probabilities.
 The reduction in prices was accompanied by a drop in default
recovery rates and an increase in implied default probabilities.
This relationship is accomplished if we take a longer period so that
statistic errors can be compensated for. Considering the period extend-
ing from October 19th to December 21st, along which bond prices reg-
istered a downward trend, it is possible to observe that default recovery
rates start at USD 40.9 for each USD 100 face value and reach USD 20.8
whereas base default probability () starts at 13.3% and reaches 45.5%
(See Figure 6 and the Table in the Appendix).
In brief, the results obtained show that for long periods (e.g. a two-
month period), the model produces results which are consistent in time
and coherent with the economic theory. These results are likely to be
optimised by the use of a higher resolution Solver which operates in the
limit to equalise statistic errors particularly, square residuals to zero.
Figure 6: Default Recovery Rate and Base Default Probability with
Trendline
Figure 6a: Logarithmic Trendline
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Figure 6b: 3rd Order Polynomial Trendline
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3.1 Interpretation of Results
Market information produced between December 10th and December
28th, before and after default was o¢ cially announced, is presented in
the following Table:
Table 2: Estimated Parameters:
Before and after Default (December 24th)
Date RA 03 RA 06 RA 10 RA 17 RA 27 AveragePrice
Recovery
Rate
10 Dec 36.8 32.8 29.0 29.0 29.0 31.32 20.73
11 Dec 36.0 34.0 29.0 30.0 29.0 31.60 22.04
12 Dec 35.9 34.4 30.1 30.0 31.0 32.28 24.16
14 Dec 37.0 33.1 30.0 27.1 32.0 31.84 22.15
17 Dec 37.0 33.6 29.4 30.0 31.5 32.20 23.30
18 Dec 35.5 34.0 30.5 27.5 32.0 31.90 24.21
19 Dec 36.1 33.4 29.5 25.8 30.0 30.96 20.77
20 Dec 28.5 34.5 29.5 26.3 32.0 30.16 16.08
21 Dec 28.9 28.5 26.0 23.9 25.3 26.52 20.79
26 Dec 28.0 28.0 23.3 23.9 26.0 25.84 20.01
27 Dec 29.8 25.5 24.0 26.0 23.0 25.66 17.50
28 Dec 31.0 28.0 26.0 28.0 25.0 27.60 20.15
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These data show that the market adjusted bond prices ranging from
USD 30.02 for each USD 100 face value to USD 26.5 on December 21st
after the resignation of the Minister of Economy and the President, in-
stead of producing the adjustment on December 26th after default was
o¢ cially announced. Thus, we understand that Argentina really de-
faulted on December 21st.8
As regards the default recovery rates evidenced between December
10th and December 28th, these estimations make for a good approxima-
tion to the market value as they present quite small square residuals,
except for those registered on December 20th. It should be obseved that
estimations recorded on December 20th registered square residuals of
three digits. Consequently, in order to obtain a better approximation to
this value, we will take the average value of default recovery rates in the
pre-default period i.e. between December 10th and December 19th .
This average value amounts to USD 22.48.9
Data Average
Average Price USD 31.5
Recovery Rate (1) USD 22.5
Period: 10 – 20 / 12 / 2001
Interval
USD 30.2   -   USD 32.3
USD 20.7   -   USD 24.2
To sum up, the results before and after market adjustment were as
follows:
Data Average
Average Price (2) USD 26.4
Recovery Rate USD 19.6
Interval
USD 25.8   -   USD 27.6
USD 20.8   -   USD 17.5
Period: 21 – 28 / 12 / 2001
Market average prices registered as of December 21st the date the
market considers Argentina defaulted are considered as the default
recovery rates validated by the market. As a result, this paper compares
8Brief chronicle of the events leading to the crisis: On December 20th, the Minister
of Economy, Dr. Domingo F. Cavallo, and the President, Dr. Fernando De La Rúa,
submit their resignation. On December 21st, the president of the Senate, Dr. Ramón
Puerta, takes over provisionally for a 48-hour period. On December 23rd, Dr. Adolfo
Rodríguez Saa is appointed as President. On December 24th, he announces the
countrys insolvency before the National Congress.
9Given that the market price on December 20th registers USD 30.2, less than the
prices registered between December 10th and December 19th (USD 31.0 - USD 32.3),
the Default Recovery Rate implicit in that price should be marginally smaller but in
no case close to USD 16.08.
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market prices registered on December 21st and the default recovery rate
evidenced on December 20th. In other words, if the economic system
unexpectedly defaults in a period t, the market price in the period t+1
should be equal to the recovery rate implicit in the last market price.
Thus, we have that:
Data Average
The difference:
(2) – (1)
USD 3.9
Interval
USD 5.1 - USD 3.4
It follows that bonds were overvalued at USD 3.9 on average (in a
range of USD 5.1 and USD 3.4); that is, by 12.9%. We interpret that
it would have been correct to adopt a short position and buy when the
market evidenced the model estimations; that is when the assets were
quoted at average values of USD 22.5 (in a range of USD 20.7 and USD
24.2)10 as it happened as of May 2002.
However, for a proper interpretation of the data, it is crucial to sit-
uate the model in the market conditions registered at the time. With
this respect, two elements should be highlighted. Firstly: the Stage 1
of the debt swap started on October 30th; the public debt held by do-
mestic investors was forcibly swapped in this stage, replacing the bonds
which accrued an annual 10.4% interest on average with bonds quoted
at a 6% annual interest rate. This explains why Argentinean Bonds were
qualied as Selective Default (SD)11. Secondly: the interest rate spread
between the peso and the dollar was widened in the second semester of
2001 (See Figure A1). This implies that if the expectation of devalua-
tion became real, the government would signicantly reduce its capacity
of repayment, and, as a result, Sovereign Bonds would lose even more
value.
These two reasons explain why the market assumed a scenario of
default with a probability close to one and a relation debt- GDP which
reduced the capacity of the State to face its obligations even further.
This information is included in the market price of Argentinean bonds.
Considering the aforesaid reasons, it should be assumed that the mar-
ket had foreseen the scenario of default and that market prices before
December 20th were the recovery rates of Sovereign Bonds.
10These values are correspondent with the Recovery Rates previous to the market
adjustment.
11In these days, the Risk Country Premium went from 1200 basic points to 1600
basic points.
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These two reasons explain why it should understood that the market
had assumed a scenario of default with a probability close to the unity
and a debt-to-GDP ratio reducing the capacity of the government to
face its obligations even further. Considering the aforesaid reasons, it
should be assumed that the market had foreseen the scenario of default
and that market prices before December 20th were already the recovery
rates of sovereign bonds. In other words, as it can be seen in equation
(1), before December 20th bond prices were as follows:
V0 =
NX
t=1
fpt:ft:Rg
where pt is equal to the unity.
Nevertheless, as of December 20th there is a break in the price series,
going from USD 30.2 to USD 26.5, i.e., an 11.7% reduction. Another
relevant element is that after default, the prices kept decreasing until
they stabilised at USD 20 in March 2002.
Alternatively, if the market was arbitrated assuming a default prob-
ability equal to the unity, the continuous reduction in default recovery
rates could be explained by the signicant deterioration registered in
the macroeconomic variables attributed to governability or management
factors. In this respect we assume that, at the beginning, investors
were not expecting such a long period to start the restructuring debt
process. Thus, investors considered that USD 26.4 was the equivalent of
the present value of an asset payable in the short term.
Finally, following the chronology of events, Argentina stopped servic-
ing its USD 80,000 millions of sovereign bonds domestic and international
on December 24th 2001. Later, Argentina dismantled the Convertibility
Systemdevaluing the local currency (see Table A1 and Figure A2). It
was the biggest sovereign default in history. Indeed, the 152 varieties of
bonds eligible for the exchange amounted to just 55% of its total debt
last year. After a three-year period of restructuring, creditors accepted
the Argentinean o¤er taking a 70% loss, twice the average haircut in
recent sovereign defaults. Only two days after the negotiation process
had ended, the Minister of Economy, Roberto Lavagna, announced that
the provisional take-up was 76%. Even if after the swap the Argentinean
debt amounts to more than $120 billion pesos, the government will still
have to face a public debt of approximately 80% of the GDP.12
12During its economic crisis the federal government shouldered the debts of the
provincial governments and stu¤ed the country banks and pension funds with bonds,
called BODENs, which were then forcibly converted to pesos.
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3.2 Debt Haircut: a wise decision
Assuming a 70% haircut over the Argentinean debt and considering the
estimated recovery rate through the model of USD 21.7, Argentina could
have overcome its default with a country risk premium of around 1960
basic points assuming a 2% risk-free interest rate and preserving the
currently Bond Term Structurewhereas Russia did it paying 1000 bp
(see Figure A3). Thus, Argentinean restructured bonds will have a 21.6%
average annual rate of return. Such a high country risk premium after
debt restructuring, calls for a debt haircut consistent in the long-term.
In other words, a haircut that applies not only to face value but also
to the temporal term structure and the interest rate coupons should be
fully justied. The Argentinean debt of 80% of GDP remains higher
than the 52% debt ran by its neighbour, Brazil. But the interest burden
on Argentinean debts is considerably lighter and the maturity schedule
is more exible.13
Regarding the aggressive haircut inicted to creditors and the punish-
ment they expected to impose on Argentina, it appears that capital mar-
kets have a remarkably poor memory. Evidence shows that Brazil has
defaulted seven times; Venezuela nine times and Argentina ve times.
In the past 175 years, Argentina defaulted or restructured its debt on
ve occasions: 2001, 1989, 1982, 1890 and 1828. Even if investors have
always returned to Argentina, it should be noticed that the country has
always paid a price for their investments.
4 Conclusion
Along the period extending from October 18th to December 24th 2001,
the average market price of the assets registered a downward trend,
falling from USD 56.8 to USD 26.5. As such, the default recovery rate
descended from USD 38.7 to USD 20.8 whereas the base default proba-
bility registered an increase from 19.4% to 45.5%. Notice that when
sovereign bonds prices are deeply stressed, the model is particularly
relevant in explaining bond price volatility by means of both implicit
determinants.
Comparing these estimations with Merricks, it appears that the de-
fault recovery rates registered in Russia, before currency devaluation and
13In other debt restructuring processes, creditors had to accept either a cut in the
principal, a lengthening of maturity or a reduction in interest payments. Argentina
has achieved all three o¤ering a 42-year bond.
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the announcement of default, were very similar to those of Argentina fac-
ing the same scenario. On average, these rates were USD 27.3 and USD
21.5, respectively. Under these circumstances, both countries registered
a country risk premium which ranged from 5000 basic points to 6000
basic points.
Nevertheless, during the Russian crisis, Argentina preserved a signif-
icantly superior level of recovery, if compared with Russia or Argentina
in December 2001. In the context of the Russian crisis, Argentina regis-
tered a country risk premium which ranged from 600 basic points to 750
basic points and a USD 51.2 average recovery rate. This approximately
doubled the value registered by Russian and Argentinean bonds in the
scenario of local crisis. Sovereign Bonds from emerging countries facing
unstable macroeconomic conditions su¤er a signicant reduction in their
recovery rate which amounts to approximately 50% when compared
with the bonds issued in countries facing stable macroeconomic funda-
mentals and a stable currency value, as was the case in Argentina in
August 1998.
Extending this research to test the contagion e¤ect over Brazilian
economy, it appears that almost 100% of the volatility a¤ecting Brazil-
ian bond prices can be explained in terms of the default recovery rate
volatility, whereas the base default probability remains close to zero.
Brazilian bond prices have never reached the low level registered in Ar-
gentina or Russia, in December 2001 and August 1998, respectively. In
the months preceding and following Argentinean default, the average
price level was never inferior to USD 85 for each USD 100 face value.
It should be noticed that in the week extending from October 2nd to
October 10th 2001, bond prices stood at USD 80 on average, whereas
the average default recovery rate was USD 67.9 and the base default
probability 1.45%.
Considering the USD 21.7 default recovery rate estimated by the
model and assuming a 70% haircut, Argentina would have overcome its
default with a country risk premium of 1960 basic points whereas Russia
overcame default with a premium of 1000 basic points. Thus, Argentina
restructured bonds will have an average annual rate of return of 21.6%.
Such a high country risk premium after debt restructuring justies a
haircut which is consistent in the long-term. Thus, a signicant haircut
which covers a cut in the principal, a lengthening of maturity schedules
and a reduction in the payment of interest should be considered as a fair
renegotiating result. Looking back on Argentinean economic history, we
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may predict that foreign capitals will make new investments for which
the country will probably have to pay a premium.
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6 Appendix
Figure A1: Peso Dollar Interest Rate Spread Dynamic for Short Term
Deposits.
FigureA1a: Deposits over 1 million pesos
Pesos-Dollar Interest Rate Spread for Short Term Deposits
(up to 59 days) over $1,000,000
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FigureA1b: Deposits under 1 million pesos
Pesos-Dollar Interest Rate Spread for Short Term Deposits
(up to 59 days) under $1,000,000
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Figure A2: Exchange Rate Dynamics after the Currency Board
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Figure A3: Argentinean and Russian Country Risk Spread.Period:
January 1999 December 2002
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Table A1: International Evidence about Changes in the Exchange Rate
Regime
Russia '98 Argentine '01 Argentine '89
Exchange Rate before Devaluation 6.29 1.00 25.00
Devaluation
Date Aug-1998 Dec-2001 Feb-1989
Exchange Rate a Month After 16.06 2.15 40.48
Variation (%) 155,3 115.0 61.9
Exchange Rate a Year After 17.00 3.37 3.69
Variation (%) 293.5 237.0 14.671,6
Exchange Rate Two Years After 27.77 2.95 9.42
Variation (%) 72.9 195.0 23.180,5
Solver Results Sample: The data and the results produced by the
Solver for a specic day are presented in the tables. This exercise was
repeated for each day in the quarter analysed.
Tables and Figure Sample for October 1st 2001.
BOND
DESCRIPTION Duration Yield Price
Global Bond Arg. 03 1.74 35.0% 70.75
Global Bond Arg. 06 3.48 26.7% 63.5
Global Bond Arg. 10 4.25 27.0% 55.25
Global Bond Arg. 17 4.65 24.2% 56.25
Global Bond Arg. 27 5.38 20.9% 51.75
The Data
Market
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BOND
DESCRIPTION Duration Yield Price Alpha Beta Recovery
Global Bond Arg. 03 1.79 34.0% 70.6 0.15 0.00 28.45
Global Bond Arg. 06 3.49 26.5% 63.7
Global Bond Arg. 10 4.30 26.8% 54.1 1.92 Minimised Equation (5)
Global Bond Arg. 17 4.78 23.8% 56.8 0.00
Global Bond Arg. 27 5.47 23.8% 52.3
The Results
Parameters
Equation (6) Equalised
to zero
Model
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The Market The Model
The blue logarithmic curve represents the market curve whereas the
pink line represents the curve which results from the estimations pro-
duced by the model. In the gure, it is possible to visualise the degree
of adjustment the model proposes in the cases of small statistic errors,
which are less than 2 as this case shows. A Solver of a higher resolution
would enable a level of adjustment for all price combinations.
Table A2: Data and Results: The bigger Square Residuals which could
still be optimised are emphasised in bold type.
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Date RA 03 RA 06 RA 10 RA 17 RA 27 AveragePrices Alpha
Recovery
Rates (SSR)
1st Oct. 70,8 63,5 55,3 56,3 51,8 59,5 14,82 28,45 1,92
2 69,8 62,5 53,0 56,0 49,8 58,2 14,95 27,21 1,83
3 69,1 61,6 52,5 54,0 49,8 57,4 15,28 28,45 1,95
4 67,6 59,6 50,3 52,7 48,4 55,7 15,68 27,07 0,38
5 67,9 58,6 49,3 52,1 47,8 55,1 15,00 27,92 0,95
9 64,3 57,5 49,3 50,5 47,8 53,9 17,50 27,47 2,34
10 64,4 57,9 49,6 50,4 47,6 54,0 17,12 26,80 3,69
11 65,5 58,7 54,3 51,1 48,5 55,6 20,46 34,79 33,78
12 64,9 59,1 51,0 51,5 48,4 55,0 16,99 27,71 5,04
15 65,0 58,0 49,9 52,0 48,0 54,6 18,21 30,68 2,86
16 65,7 60,4 52,0 54,1 50,5 56,5 20,70 38,65 15,48
17 67,4 63,3 55,0 58,8 52,0 59,3 17,25 33,42 7,90
18 66,5 58,8 54,1 54,6 50,1 56,8 19,37 38,71 19,09
19 67,5 59,0 56,2 55,3 53,3 58,3 13,28 40,94 20,40
22 68,5 59,9 55,5 56,5 53,0 58,7 18,12 34,38 7,39
23 68,0 60,3 54,8 55,8 51,5 58,1 18,93 39,35 15,65
24 67,5 61,3 53,8 55,5 52,5 58,1 17,79 33,09 1,42
25 67,0 60,5 53,4 55,0 52,0 57,6 19,31 39,48 11,03
26 64,9 58,5 50,6 53,6 49,8 55,5 19,20 32,85 0,97
29 56,4 53,8 45,5 51,8 47,9 51,1 27,14 37,29 6,71
30 58,0 56,0 45,3 48,0 42,0 49,9 18,84 25,42 25,91
31st Oct. 54,0 51,8 44,9 47,0 45,0 48,5 27,12 34,50 8,47
1st Nov. 51,4 49,4 41,4 45,1 43,0 46,1 28,27 32,77 7,79
2 40,0 42,5 39,8 40,8 37,0 40,0 27,77 39,27 15,18
5 50,2 47,8 39,8 43,9 40,7 44,5 27,72 30,59 8,56
6 49,0 47,0 41,0 44,0 43,0 44,8 32,68 34,48 3,49
7 50,0 46,8 43,8 44,3 44,0 45,8 33,64 36,03 5,38
8 48,5 46,5 41,3 42,0 40,0 43,7 30,47 31,83 12,69
9 47,5 45,0 39,0 40,0 40,0 42,3 30,51 30,42 9,23
12 47,0 48,0 39,8 40,5 40,5 43,2 31,84 32,21 27,06
13 46,0 41,4 37,4 40,5 36,0 40,3 30,44 28,17 6,82
14 46,0 41,0 35,5 40,0 38,0 40,1 30,73 28,22 0,35
15 49,0 43,0 37,5 38,0 38,0 41,1 26,11 25,45 6,76
16 47,0 40,5 34,4 37,3 33,0 38,4 25,22 21,59 5,65
19 44,8 39,0 33,4 35,3 31,0 36,7 26,16 20,66 10,63
20 40,6 35,0 29,3 35,3 30,0 34,0 30,35 21,43 6,38
21 42,0 36,0 31,4 37,3 30,0 35,3 29,86 22,46 15,08
22 41,0 38,0 31,9 36,8 34,0 36,3 33,74 26,11 2,81
23 45,5 38,0 32,1 37,8 34,0 37,5 20,81 14,63 40,56
26 46,0 39,4 36,5 40,1 37,0 39,8 21,89 18,16 56,97
27 45,0 39,8 33,6 37,8 37,0 38,6 30,13 26,21 1,33
28 45,0 40,2 32,9 38,0 35,0 38,2 28,60 24,55 2,70
29 44,5 39,0 32,4 33,8 30,0 35,9 25,10 18,71 12,84
30th Nov. 44,5 35,3 30,3 32,0 29,0 34,2 24,64 16,28 3,94
1st Dec. 37,0 34,4 29,5 37,3 26,0 32,8 34,7 22,94 50,24
4 42,0 38,0 32,0 37,9 30,0 36,0 29,1 22,60 21,92
5 38,1 30,4 31,3 31,6 30,0 32,3 27,5 17,20 33,65
6 37,0 33,8 30,0 30,5 28,0 31,9 33,6 21,28 12,15
7 37,0 33,5 29,5 31,0 30,0 32,2 35,0 22,45 3,52
10 36,8 32,8 29,0 29,0 29,0 31,3 33,6 20,73 8,21
11 36,0 34,0 29,0 30,0 29,0 31,6 35,4 22,04 8,98
12 35,9 34,4 30,1 30,0 31,0 32,3 38,3 24,16 10,34
14 37,0 33,1 30,0 27,1 32,0 31,8 35,1 22,15 28,60
17 36,5 33,6 29,4 30,0 31,5 32,2 36,6 23,30 6,98
18 35,5 34,0 30,5 27,5 32,0 31,9 39,4 24,21 28,80
19 36,1 33,4 29,5 25,8 30,0 31,0 34,3 20,77 35,52
20 28,5 34,5 29,5 26,3 32,0 30,2 28,9 16,08 161,81
21st Dec. 28,9 28,5 26,0 23,9 25,3 26,5 45,5 20,79 17,10
26 28,0 28,0 23,3 23,9 26,0 25,8 45,3 20,01 9,41
27 29,8 25,5 24,0 26,0 23,0 25,7 38,9 17,50 5,37
28th Dec. 31,0 28,0 26,0 28,0 25,0 27,6 40,4 20,15 5,11
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